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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
While travelling down 1-84 in Gooding County, Beatrice Coleman and Ernest
McGhee were pulled over by an Idaho State Police Trooper for signaling for less than 5
seconds before changing from the left to right lane.

The district court granted the

defendants' motions to dismiss finding that the 5-second-rule, enumerated in I.C. § 49808(2) and relied upon by the Trooper to justify the seizure, applies only to vehicles
which are both on a controlled-access highway and are turning from a parked position,
but does not apply when vehicles are changing lanes.

The State of Idaho timely

appeals from the Judgments of Dismissal entered in each of the above cases and
asserts that I.C. § 49-808(2) requires a driver to signal for 5 seconds before changing
lanes while on a controlled access highway, and therefore, the State asserts
Ms. Coleman and Mr. McGhee were not unlawfully seized.

Alternatively, the State

asserts that this Court should find that the trooper who pulled them over made a
reasonable mistake of law, and should reverse the district court's dismissal on this
basis. Ms. Coleman and Mr. McGhee assert that this Court should affirm the district
court's orders dismissing their respective cases.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State filed separate amended complaints against Ms. Coleman and
Mr. McGhee alleging that each committed the crime of trafficking in marijuana by
possession of more than 1 pound, but less than 5 pounds, of marijuana. (Rs., pp.21-

1

)1

During the preliminary hearing, Trooper Janeece Gonzales testified that she was

patrolling 1-84 in Gooding County with another trooper when she saw the vehicle driven
by Ms. Coleman (with Mr. McGhee in the back seat) signal for 3 seconds prior

to

changing from the left to right lane after passing a semi-truck, and she executed a traffic
stop. (Tr. Prelim, pp.5-10, 26-31.) 2 A subsequent investigation revealed that the two
were driving through Idaho on their way to Pennsylvania, Ms. Coleman had an Oregon
medical marijuana card and Mr. McGhee had an Oregon medical marijuana grower's
license, and there was one and one-half pounds of marijuana in the trunk. (Tr. Prelim,
pp.11-26, 31-38.)
The magistrate bound the two over into the district court and Informations were
filed charging each with the crime of trafficking in marijuana by possession of between 1
and 5 pounds of marijuana.

(Rs., pp.38, 44-46.) Counsel for both defendants 3 filed

Motions to Dismiss in each case arguing "that there was no articulable suspicion and/or
probable cause to stop the Defendant[s] for a violation of I.C. § 49-808(2)" or
alternatively, that the statute is "unconstitutionally vague on its face and/or as applied to
the Defendant[s'] conduct and the stop of the vehicle was unlawful because the traffic
statute that [the Defendant] was deemed had violation (sic), I.C. § 49-808(2), is void for
vagueness as applied to [the Defendant]." (Rs., pp.54-55.)

1

These two appeals were consolidated by order of this Court on January 6, 2014. The
district court created Clerk's Records for each of these cases which are essentially
identical with the exception that the documents in each Record refer to the individual
defendants. Because documents in each of the Clerk's Records contain matching page
numbers, the records in each case will be cited as "Rs." with a single page number
designation.
2 The transcript of the preliminary hearing is included as an exhibit in the Clerk's
Records for each case. (Rs., p.90.) Although each page of the transcript contains the
numbers 1-25 purportedly delineating the line numbers, each page of the transcript has
only 23 lines of text. Therefore, citations to this transcript will include only the page
numbers.

2

During the dismissal hearing, defense counsel argued that I.C. § 49-808(2)
requires a driver

a vehicle to use a turn signal for 5 seconds only where the vehicle is

both on a controlled-access highway and turning from a parked position, and that any
other reading of the statute makes the statute void for vagueness as applied to the
defendants.

(Tr., p.6, L.20 - p.13, L.17.)

The State argued that the officer had a

reasonable suspicion of a violation of I.C. § 49-808(2) citing decisions from Canyon
County district court judges, who had ruled that I.C. § 49-808(2) applies either when on
a controlled-access highway or when turning from a parked position 4 , as persuasive
authority. (Tr., p.13, L.20 - p.17, L.20.) The prosecutor further asked the district court
to consider the Court of Appeals' decision in State v. McCarthy, 133 Idaho 119 (1999) a "decision that talks about when evaluating if there is, in fact, an allegation of a mistake
of fact on behalf of the officer, ... ". (Tr., p.17, L.21 - p.18, L.6.) Finally, the prosecutor
argued that the statute is not void for vagueness asserting that a person of ordinary
intelligence would interpret the statute in the same way the Canyon County district court
judges interpreted the statute. (Tr., p.18, L.7 - p.19, L.2.) The parties submitted as
evidence the preliminary hearing transcripts and Trooper Gonzales' dash-cam video,
and the court took the matter under advisement. (Tr., p.4, L.25 - p.6, L.19, p.19, L.24
p.20, L.2.)
The district court issued a written decision granting the Motions to Dismiss 5 filed
in each case.

(Rs., pp.67-74.)

The court found that Ms. Coleman's vehicle was

3

The same attorney, Philip Brown, represented both defendants.
One of the Canyon County cases relied upon by the prosecutor is State v. Brooks,
which is currently on appeal and has been assigned to the Court of Appeals. (See
State v. Brooks, Supreme Court docket number 41046.)
5 In its Appellant's Brief, the State asserts that the court "articulated no legal basis for
dismissing the case, as opposed to suppressing the evidence" but "acknowledge[d] that
4

3

travelling in the left lane and "gradually merged back into the right lane of traffic a safe
d

ahead of the semi-truck."

(Rs., p.67.)

The court did not make a specific

finding that Trooper Gonzales' testimony that Ms. Coleman signaled for only 3 seconds
prior to changing lanes was credible, noting that the dash-cam footage was
inconclusive; however, the court found that the footage does show that Ms. Coleman
signaled for "at least three seconds prior to the time (the] vehicle's right wheels touched
and began to cross the center line.

Thereafter, the turn signal remained on for an

additional three seconds until the vehicle completed the merge into the center of the
right lane." (Rs., pp.67-68, 68, fn.1.)
The court found that the traffic stop was unlawful.

(Rs., pp.69-72.) The court

found that the plain language of I.C. § 49-808(2) unambiguously requires a driver to
signal for five seconds only where the vehicle is both on a controlled access highway
and before turning from a parked position. (Rs., p.70.) The court found the following:
The disputed language, identified in bold above, is phrased in the
conjunctive.
It utilizes the term "and" to connect the phrases "on
controlled access highways" and "before turning from a parked position."
The plain and ordinary meaning of the term "and" is "a conjunction
connecting words or phrases expressing the idea that the latter is to be
added to or taken along with the first." Black's Law Dictionary, 86 (6th ed.
1990). In this case then, the legislature's use of the term "and" requires
that a vehicle must engage its turn single for five seconds only when that
vehicle is both (1) on a controlled access highway, and (2) turning from a
parked position. In all other instances, a vehicle must engage its turn
signal for not less than one hundred feet before turning under the plain
language of the statute.
If, as argued by the State, the legislature intended the five second
signal requirement to apply independently and separately to both (1)
vehicles on a controlled-access highway, and (2) vehicles turning from a
parked position, then the legislature would have used the disjunctive "or"
rather than the conjunctive "and" to separate the two scenarios. See e.g,
K Mart Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Comm., 111 Idaho 719, 727 P.2d 1147
[the State] would be compelled to dismiss the case for lack of evidence if the evidence
in question is ultimately suppressed." (Appellant's Brief, p.2 fn.1.)

4

(1986) (stating "If the legislature had intended to limit only the
consumption exemption, the legislature would have used the disjunctive
'or' rather than the conjunctive 'and' between the two exemption clauses").
Unlike the term "and," the term "or," has been defined by the Idaho
Supreme Court as "a disjunctive particle used to express an alternative or
to give a choice of one among two or more things." Markel Int 'I Ins. Co.,
Ltd v. Erekson, 153 Idaho 107, 110, 279 P.3d 93, 96 (2012). Therefore,
the Court finds that the State's proposed interpretation of the statute is
contrary to the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, and that
the five second signal requirement applies only when a vehicle is both on
a controlled access highway and turning from a parked position.
(Rs., pp.70-71.)
The court found that Ms. Coleman's vehicle was on a controlled-access highway
but was not turning from a parked position; therefore, Trooper Gonzales did not have a
reasonable basis to seize the occupants of the vehicle, and her belief that there was a
violation of I.C. § 49-808(2) was an unreasonable and erroneous mistake of law.
(Rs., pp. 71-72.) The court stated, "[w]hile Gonzales may have been acting in good faith
given her understanding of the statute, 'subjective good faith on the part of the officer is
not enough' to establish reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation."' (Rs, p.72 (citing

State v. McCarthy, 133 Idaho 119, 124 (Ct. App. 1999).)

The court found that

Ms. Coleman was only required to use the turn signal for not less than 100 feet and,
because the State failed to present any evidence of the length the vehicle travelled
while the turn signal was in use, the State failed to establish the warrantless seizure
was justified. (Rs., p.72.)
The district court also addressed Ms. Coleman and Mr. McGhee's alternative
argument that the statute is unconstitutionally vague. (R., pp.72-73.) The court noted
the following:
[l]f it were to accept the State's interpretation of the statute, the statute
may well be considered unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of
this case. Under the State's interpretation, the argument can be made
that the statute's use of the term "and," in an uncommon and disjunctive
5

sense, fails to provide fair notice to drivers that the five second signal
requirement applies when they are on a controlled access highway even if
they are not in a parked position. Further, the statute would not specify
that the five second period must elapse entirely before signaling to merge
or whether the five second period can include the period that the vehicle is
in the process of merging until the merge is complete.
(Rs., pp.72-73.) In a footnote, the court further explained,
When the word "and" is read in the conjunctive, the statute makes clear
that the five seconds must elapse "before turning" from a parked position
on a controlled access highway. Likewise, the statute makes clear that in
all other instances the turn signal must be engaged not less than one
hundred (100) feet "before turning." However, by giving the word "and" a
disjunctive meaning the only requirement on a controlled access highway
is that the signal be given continuously for five seconds. In this case, the
signal was given for more than five seconds prior to the completion of the
lane change.
(Rs.,

p.73, fn.1.)

Nevertheless,

the court reiterated

that the statute is not

unconstitutionally vague as the plain language of the statute requires a 5-second signal
only when the vehicle is both on a controlled-access highway and turning from a parked
position.

(Rs., pp. 72-73.)

The State filed timely Notices of Appeal from the district

court's Judgments of Dismissal entered in each case. (Rs., pp. 77-82.)

6

ISSUE
Should this Court affirm the district court's dismissal of the charges against
Ms. Coleman and Mr. McGhee as all evidence of criminal activity resulted from their
unlawful seizure?

7

ARGUMENT
This Court Should Affirm The District Court's Dismissal Of The Charges Against
Ms. Coleman And Mr. McGhee As All Evidence Of Criminal Activity Resulted From
Their Unlawful Seizure
A.

Introduction
Ms. Coleman and Mr. McGhee assert that the district court correctly determined

that, by its plain language, I.C. § 49-808(2) unambiguously requires a driver to signal for
5 seconds only when the vehicle is both on a controlled-access highway and turning
from a parked position; therefore, Trooper Gonzalez did not have an objectively
reasonable basis to seize Ms. Coleman and Mr. McGhee. Alternatively, Ms. Coleman
and Mr. McGhee assert that this Court should affirm the dismissal of the charges as
I.C. §§ 49-808(1 )-(2) requires that drivers changing lanes on a highway do so in a
reasonably safe manner and with the use a turn signal, but the use of a signal has
neither a time nor distance requirement. Furthermore, should this Court find I.C. § 49808(2) to be ambiguous, the statute is void for vagueness as applied to the defendants
in this case, and this Court should affirm the dismissals on this basis. Finally, this Court
should reject the State's attempt to justify the unlawful seizure based upon its claim that
Trooper Gonzales made a reasonable mistake of law.

8.

Relevant Jurisprudence
The standard of review of a suppression motion 6 is bifurcated. When a decision

on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court's
findings of fact which were supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the
application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.

6

State v. Atkinson, 128

Although couched as a motion to dismiss, this Court should review the case under the
legal principles governing the review of a suppression motion. (See fn.5 supra.)
8

Idaho 559, 561 (Ct. App. 1996).

The power to assess the credibility of witnesses

testifying at a suppression hearing, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw
factual inferences is vested in the trial court.

State v. Reyna, 142 Idaho 624, 626

(Ct. App. 2006).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees citizens the
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Its

purpose is "to impose a standard of 'reasonableness' upon the exercise of discretion by
government officials, including law enforcement agents, in order to 'safeguard the
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions."' Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979) (quoting Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312
(1978)). If evidence is not seized pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant
requirement, the evidence discovered as a result of the illegal search must be excluded
as the "fruit of the poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
The stop of a vehicle constitutes a seizure of its occupants and is therefore
subject to Fourth Amendment restraints. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653. A police officer may
stop a vehicle for investigative purposes if the officer has an objectively reasonable
basis for suspecting that the vehicle or an occupant is involved in criminal activity. Id. at
663. There must exist "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 21 (1968). Reasonable suspicion requires less than probable cause but more than
speculation on the part of the officer. State v. Van Dome, 139 Idaho 961, 963 (Ct. App.
2004).

9

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law subject to de nova review by
an appellate court.

State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 865 (2011 ).

The following

principles of statutory interpretation apply:
The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent of the
legislative body that adopted the act. Statutory interpretation begins with
the literal language of the statute. Provisions should not be read in
isolation, but must be interpreted in the context of the entire document.
The statute should be considered as a whole, and words should be given
their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. It should be noted that the Court
must give effect to all the words and provisions of the statute so that none
will be void, superfluous, or redundant. When the statutory language is
unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be
given effect, and the Court need not consider rules of statutory
construction.
State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866-67 (2011) (citing Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund,
147 Idaho 307, 310 (2009).) The power to correct a socially or otherwise unsound
statute lies with the legislature, and not the judiciary.

Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg'/

Med. Ctr, 151 Idaho 889, 892-893 (2011 ).

C.

Idaho Code § 49-808(2) Unambiguously Requires A Driver To Signal For 5
Seconds On A Controlled Access Highway Only Before Turning From A Parked
Position, And Not Where A Driver Changes Lanes
Idaho Code§ 49-808(1) reads as follows:
No person shall turn a vehicle onto a highway7 or move a vehicle right or
left upon a highway or merge onto or exit from a highway unless and until
the movement can be made with reasonable safety nor without giving an
appropriate signal.

I.C. § 49-808(1 ). This statute describes various methods of moving a vehicle to, from,
and within a highway, and in general terms, requires that such movements be done

Idaho Code § 49-109(5) defines "Highways" as, "the entire width between the
boundary lines of every way publicly maintained when any part is open to the use of the
public for vehicular travel, with jurisdiction extending to the adjacent property line,
including sidewalks, shoulders, berms and rights-of-way not intended for motorized
traffic. The term "street" is interchangeable with highway." I.C. § 49-109(5).
7

10

reasonable safety" and with "an appropriate signal." Id. Idaho Code§ 49-808(2),
statute specifically analyzed by the district court in this

reads,

A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required shall be
given continuously to warn other traffic. On controlled-access highways 8
and before turning from a parked position, the signal shall be given
continuously for not less than five (5) seconds and, in all other instances,
for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle
before turning.
I.C. § 49-808(2).

By its plain language, the 5-second requirement applies only to

vehicles that are both "[o]n controlled-access highways and before turning from a
parked position." Id. (emphasis added).
Idaho appellate courts recognize that when the legislature uses the word "and" it
is meant as a conjunctive term. In Ameritel Inns, Inc. v. Pocatello-Chubbuck Auditorium
or Cmty. Ctr. Dist., 146 Idaho 202 (2008), the Idaho Supreme Court analyzed I.C. § 67, a statute governing auditorium districts in Idaho.

Id. at 205.

The Court

recognized "[t]he literal language of the statute requires that an auditorium district 'build,
operate, maintain, market and manage' public facilities." Id. (quoting I.C. § 67-4902)
(emphasis in original).

The Court continued, "The word 'and' is a 'conjunction

connecting words or phrases expressing the idea is to be added to or taken along with
the first."'

Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 86 (6 th ed. 1990)).

The Court then

stated, "The legislature's inclusion of the word 'and' indicates that an auditorium district
is one that performs all of the listed functions in the statute." Id. The Court construed
the statute at issue as a whole, explaining that, "[i]f the legislature wanted to make it

8

Idaho Code § 49-109(5)(c) defines "controlled-access highway" as, "Any highway or
roadway in respect to which owners or occupants of abutting lands and other persons
have no legal right of access to or from the highway except at such points only or in
such manner as may be determined by the public authority having jurisdiction over the
highway." I.C. § 49-109(5)(c).
11

clear that an auditorium could choose to only market public facilities, then it could have
used the words 'and/or,' as it did when describing the purposes that auditorium district
facilities must serve."

Id. (quoting I.C. § 67-4902).

Tt1us, the Court held "that an

auditorium district must build, operate, maintain, market, and manage a public facility.
An auditorium district cannot simply market existing facilities within its borders." Id.
Similarly, in In re Brink, 117 Idaho 55 (1990), the Supreme Court rejected the
State's argument that a statute governing the reinstatement of suspended driver's
licenses should be liberally construed in such a manner as to "require that the word
'and' be replaced with the word 'or."' Id. at 56. The Brink Court stated that, "The plain
and ordinary meaning of the statutory words in question is dispositive of the State's
argument that by substituting the word 'or' for the word 'and' we would better fulfill the
legislature's desire to enhance safety on Idaho's roads."

Id.

The Court recognized,

"Appellate courts do not have the authority to perform the type of open sentence
surgery that the State requests. Judicial construction of the legislature's words is only
warranted when the legislature's words do not have a plain and ordinary meaning." Id.
(citations omitted). "The State's requested revision would transform the phrase into one
that is disjunctive rather than conjunctive. Healthy language of the legislature needs no
incision by judicial pen." Id. at 57.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has also interpreted "and" in the conjunctive sense.
In State v. Gamino, 148 Idaho 827 (Ct. App. 2010), a case involving the interpretation of
I.C. § 19-2601, the statute authorizing sentencing courts to impose probation, the Court
of Appeals focused on the provision of the statute empowering a court to '"[s]uspend the
execution of the judgment at the time of judgment or at any time during the term of a
sentence in the county jail and place the defendant on probation under such terms and
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conditions as it deems necessary and expedient."' Id. at 830 (quoting I.C. § ·t 9-2601)
(emphasis in original). The Court concluded, "The conjunctive 'and' in this subsection of
I.C. § 19-2601 suggests that the suspension of a sentence must always be
accompanied by probation." Id.
The district court's conclusion that, based on the plain language of I.C. § 49808(2), the 5-second rule applies only when a vehicle is both on a controlled access
highway and turning from a parked position is consistent with Idaho precedent. Idaho
courts have long recognized that when the legislature uses the word "and" it is
'"conjunction connecting words or phrases expressing the idea is to be added to or
taken along with the first."' Ameritel Inns, Inc., 146 Idaho at 205 (quoting BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY

86 (6 th ed. 1990)). Therefore, the district court correctly found that Trooper

Gonzales did not have an objectively reasonable basis to seize Ms. Coleman and
Mr. McGhee based upon an alleged violation of I.C. § 49-808(2).

1.

This Court Should Reject The State's Assertion That "And." As Used In
LC. § 49-808(2), Means "Or"

In its Appellant's Brief, the State asserts that I.C. § 49-808(2) plainly and
unambiguously requires drivers to signal for 5 seconds either when driving on a
controlled access highway or when turning from a parked position and, thus, the seizure
in this case was lawful. (Appellant's Brief, pp.4-18.) While recognizing that "[t]he word
'and' is usually conjunctive," the State asserts that "depending on the context in which it
is used, the conjunction 'and' can also simply denote that there is more than one of
something." (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) Regardless of how the State couches its assertion,
the State is arguing that "and," as used in I.C. § 49-808(2), means "or."

13

However, in contrast to the case noted above recognizing that "and" is used as a
conjunctive under Idaho law, the Idaho Supreme Couri has interpreted the word "or," as
used in Idaho statutes, to have a disjunctive meaning.

As the district court in the

present case noted, ''the term 'or,' has been defined by the Idaho Supreme Court as 'a
disjunctive particle used to express an alternative or to give a choice of one among two
or more things."' (Rs., p.71 (citing Markel Int 'I Ins. Co., Ltd v. Erekson, 153 Idaho 107,
110 (2012)); see also Frasier v. Frasier, 87 Idaho 510 (1964).) Furthermore, "[a]s a
linguistic matter, 'and' and 'or' are not synonyms; indeed, they are more nearly
antonyms.

One need only start the day with a breakfast of ham or eggs to be duly

impressed by the difference." MacDonald v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 859 F.2d 742,
746 (9 th Cir. 1988) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Even assuming that the Idaho legislature can use the word "and" to mean "or" in
certain contexts, the State makes no cogent argument supporting its claim that the
legislature meant such a usage in the clause at issue - "On controlled-access highways
and before turning from a parked position" - contained in I.C. § 49-808(2). The State
asserts the following,
The legislature used the word "and" twice in 49-808(2) - once to indicate
the two circumstances in which a five-second signal is required and
again, in the same sentence, to indicate a third circumstance, i.e. "all other
instances," in which a signal is required "for not less than the last one
hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning." Given the
context in which the word "and" appears throughout the statute, it is clear
that the legislature intended its placement between the phrases "[o]n
controlled-access highways" and "before turning from a parked position"
simply to indicate there is more than one circumstance, or "instance," in
which the five-second signal requirement applies.
(Appellant's Brief, p.9.) However, simply noting that the legislature used the word "and"
twice in the same sentence, does not support the argument that the legislature meant to
use the word "and" as something other than as a conjunctive.
14

The

State

further asserts that had

the

legislature

intended that both

circumstances exist before the 5-second rule applies, it could have written the statute to
say '"[b]efore turning from a parked position on controlled access-highways" - thus
eliminating the need for the word 'and' between the two prepositional phrases at all."
(Appellant's Brief, pp.10-11.) Of course, had the legislature intended to require the a 5second signal either when on a controlled access highway or when turning from a
parked position, the legislature could have just as easily written the statute as "On
controlled access highways OR before turning from a parked position."
The State also cites to State v. Enking, 59 Idaho 321 (1938), for the proposition
that an appellate court has the authority to exchange the meaning of the word "and" for
the meaning of the word "or" to give effect to a statute, harmonize its parts, or carry out
what the Court perceives to be the legislative intent.

(Appellant's Brief, p.11.)

Regardless of what the Idaho Supreme Court thought of the concept of separation of
powers during the Great Depression, the Court has recently made it abundantly clear
that it only interprets statutes, it does not rewrite them, and it cannot exchange the word
"and" for the word "or".

See Schulz; Verska; In re Brink. The State's argument that

I.C. § 49-808(2) unambiguously requires drivers to signal for 5 seconds either when on
a controlled-access highway or when turning from a parked position is without merit.

2.

If This Court Adopts The State's Interpretation That The Word "And" Is
Used In The Disjunctive In I.C. § 49-808(2), This Court Must Find That
The Statute Does Not Require A Driver To Complete The 5-Second Signal
Before Changing Lanes, And The Seizure In This Case Is Unlawful As
Ms. Coleman Signaled For More Than 5 Seconds While Completing The
Lane Change

If this Court adopts the State's argument that "the legislature intended its
placement between the phrases '[o]n controlled-access highways' and 'before turning
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from a parked position' simply to indicate there is more than one circumstance, or
'instance,' in which the five-second signal requirement applies" (Appellant's Brief, p.9),
this Court must necessarily also find that the legislature specifically required the
second signaling period be completed before turning from a parked position, but did not
require that the entire 5-second signaling period to occur before changing lanes.
As noted above Idaho Code§ 49-808(1) reads as follows:
No person shall turn a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle right or
left upon a highway or merge onto or exit from a highway unless and until
the movement can be made with reasonable safety nor without giving an
appropriate signal.
I.C. § 49-808(1 ).

The statute describes various means of movement on a highway:

"turn a vehicle onto a highway," "move a vehicle right or left upon a highway," and
"merge onto or exit from a highway." Id.

In each of these instances, the movement

must be both made with "reasonable safety," and with "giving an appropriate signal." Id.
However, the statute does not say either when the signal must be initiated in relation to
the movement, or for how long the signal must last. Id.
Idaho Code § 49-808(2) provides instructions on when and for how long a signal
is required for some, but not all, of the movements described in subsection 1.
A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required shall be
given continuously to warn other traffic. On controlled-access highways
and before turning from a parked position, the signal shall be given
continuously for not less than five (5) seconds and, in all other instances,
for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle
before turning.
I.C. § 49-808(2) (emphasis added).

If, as the State asserts, "On controlled-access

highways" and "before turning from a parked position" are separate circumstances in
which the 5-second rule applies, then by its plain language, when moving "left or right"
"[o]n controlled-access highways," the driver need only signal "continuously for not less
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than five (5) seconds." However, the statute does not require that the entire 5-second
signaling period be complete "before" the driver changes lanes as the word "before"
does not modify the "[o]n controlled-access highways" clause.

In contrast, under the

State's reading of this statute, a driver who is in a parked position must signal for 5
seconds "before turning" from that position, just as "in all other instances," a driver must
signal "for not less than the last one hundred ( 100) feet traveled by the vehicle before
turning." I.C. § 49-808(2) (emphasis added).
If, as the State asserts, the legislature clearly and unambiguously used the word
"and" to separate the circumstances of a vehicle being on a controlled access highway,
from a vehicle in a parked position, then the legislature clearly and unambiguously used
the word "before" to require drivers to complete the 5-second signaling period before
turning from that parked position, but also clearly and unambiguously chose not to use
the word "before" to require drivers to complete the 5-second period when changing
lanes on a controlled-access highway. Because the district court specifically found that
Ms. Coleman signaled continuously for a total of 6 seconds (see Rs., p.68, fn.1 ), even
under the State's reading of I.C. § 49-808(2), Ms. Coleman did not violate the statute,
and she and Mr. McGhee were unlawfully seized.

D.

Trooper Gonzales Did Not Have An Objectively Reasonable Suspicion Of An
Improper Use Of A Turn Signal Because Ms. Coleman Changed Lanes With
Reasonable Safety And Signaled Her Intention To Do So
The district court held that the 5-second rule enumerated in I.C. § 49-808(2)

applies only where the vehicle is both on a controlled access highway and turning from
a parked position, and that all other circumstances require a signal for the last 100 feet.
(Rs., pp.69-72.) Ms. Coleman and Mr. McGhee assert that this Court should affirm the
district court's finding on this basis. The court also found that, because the State failed
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to provide any evidence that Ms. Coleman signaled for less than 100 feet prior to
changing lanes 9 , there was no reasonable suspicion to justify her and Mr. McGhee's
seizures.

Id. Additionally, Ms. Coleman and Mr. McGhee assert that this Court can

affirm on an alternative basis; namely, that by the plain language of I.C. § 19-808(2), the
temporal (5-second rule) and spatial ( 100-feet) rules apply only when "turning" and do
not apply when changing lanes or making any other movement on a highway. Where
the district court reaches the correct result under the wrong theory, the appellate court
will affirm the district court under the correct theory. See Markel Intern. Ins. Co., Ltd. v.
Erekson, 153 Idaho 107 (2012).

Once again, Idaho Code§ 49-808(1) reads as follows:
No person shall turn a vehicle onto a highway or move a vehicle
or left upon a highway or merge
or exit from a highway unless and
until the movement can be made with reasonable safety nor without
giving an appropriate signal.
I.C. § 49-808(1) (emphasis added). The statute describes three means of movement;

turning a vehicle onto a highway, moving a vehicle right or left upon a highway, or
merging onto or exiting from a highway. Id. In each of these instances, the movement
must be made both with "reasonable safety," and with "giving an appropriate signal." Id.
The first sentence of I.C. § 49-808(2) - "A signal of intention to turn or move right
or left when required shall be given continuously to warn others traffic" - by its plain
language deals with "turn[ing]" or "mov[ing] right or left" on a highway, requiring only that

9

Although there was no testimony as to how fast Ms. Coleman was driving, she was
pulled over on 1-84 in Gooding County. There are 5,280 feet in a mile and 3,600
seconds in an hour. A vehicle travelling at a rate of 75 miles per hour, for a period 3
seconds, travels approximately 330 feet. (110 feet per second (rate) (75 x 5280 feet=
369,400 feet per hour I 3,600 seconds = 110 feet per second)) x 3 seconds (time) = 330
feet (distance).) Ms. Coleman and Mr. McGhee assert that, assuming they were
required to signal for 100 feet prior to changing lanes, the undisputed facts in this case
mathematically prove that they did so.
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a signal be given continuously. I.C. § 49-808(2). In contrast, in the second sentence of
I.C. § 49-808(2)

"(o]n controlled-access highways and before turning from a parked

position, the signal shall be given continuously for not less than five (5) seconds and, in
all other instances, for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the
vehicle before turning" - the legislature declared that the specific signaling requirements
relate only to when a vehicle is "turn[ingJ," implicitly exempting any specific signaling
requirement when the vehicle is "mov[ing] right or left." Id. When read in conjunction
with I.C. § 49-808(1 ), a person who is moving left or right on, but not turning onto, an
Idaho highway must do so with reasonable safety and by giving an appropriate signal,
but that signal is not required to last for any specific duration, or for any specific length
of road travelled.

I.C. §§ 49-808(1 )-(2).

The State recognizes this possible reading of the statute stating, "under the
district court's interpretation, a person driving on a controlled-access highway would
never have to signal an intention to move right or left for any particular time or distance."
(Appellant's Brief, pp.12-13.) The State then goes on to suggest, "[c]learly, this could
not have been the legislature's intent."

(Appellant's Brief, p.13.)

The State fails,

however, to provide any support for its proposition that this was not the legislature's
intent, let alone that it "clearly" was not.

A driver changing lanes must do so in a

reasonably safe manner and must signal an intention to do so. I.C. §§ 49-808(1 )-(2).
To read I.C. 49-808(2) as encompassing all cars would render I.C. § 49-808(1)
superfluous.

If I.C. § 49-808(2) gives the specific time and distance requirements for

signaling in all vehicle movements, there would be no need for I.C. § 49-808(1 )'s
requirement that such movements require turn signals and be reasonably safe. See
I.C. § 49-808(1 ). Under the State's rationale, a driver on a controlled-access highway
19

could signal an intention to do so for five seconds, then tum off the tum signal, then
change lanes, and would still be in compliance with I.C. § 49-808(2). The State offers
no rationale for how this is "clearly" what the legislature intended while signaling for 3
seconds prior to changing lanes, keeping the signal on throughout the lane change, and
turning the signal off only after having completed the lane change for a total of 6
seconds of signaling, does not serve the legislative purposed embodied in the plain
language of the relevant statutes.
The State also claims in a footnote that "[t]he alternative reading is that the
statute requires a signal 'for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled' when
'turning from a parked position' on a road other than a controlled-access highway, an
obvious impossibility." (Appellant's Brief, p.13, fn.3.) Idaho Code § 49-603 states, "No
person shall start movement of a vehicle which is stopped, standing or parked unless
movement can be made with reasonable safety."

I.C. § 49-603. When reading this

statute in pari materia with I.C. §§ 49-808(1 )-(2), Idaho drivers may pull onto a noncontrolled-access highway from a parked position only if it is reasonably safe to do so,
and provided the drivers signal their intention of doing so for some amount of time they are only required to signal for 5 seconds before turning if they are turning onto a
controlled-access highway. I.C. §§ 49-603, 49-808(1 )(2).
The fundamental flaw in the State's argument is that it is based upon the
unreasonable assumption that I.C. § 49-808(2) is meant to inform people of how long
and for what distance they must signal in any and all vehicle movements. It is not. By
its plain language I.C. § 49-808(2)'s temporal and spatial requirements only apply "[o]n
controlled-access highways and before turning from a parked position, the signal shall
be given continuously for not less than five (5) seconds and, in all other instances, for
20

not

than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle before

those parked on controlled access highways before turning, and those that are already
travelling on a highway before turning. The requirements do not apply to cars merging
onto or off of highways, those changing lanes by moving left or right, or those moving on
to a non-controlled-access highway from a parked position.
In the present case, the district court specifically found that Ms. Coleman both
signaled for at least 3 seconds prior to changing lanes and that she passed the semitruck already in the right lane at "a safe distance."

(Rs., pp.67-68.)

Thus, the

undisputed factual findings demonstrate that Ms. Coleman continuously signaled her
intention to change lanes and did so with reasonable safety.

Therefore, Trooper

Gonzalez did not have an objectively reasonable basis to seize Ms. Coleman and
Mr. McGhee and this Court should affirm the district court's order dismissing the
charges against them.

E.

If This Court Finds I.C. § 49-808(2) To Be Ambiguous, This Court Should Find
The Statute Void For Vagueness As Applied To Ms. Coleman And Mr. McGhee
Counsel for Ms. Coleman and Mr. McGhee made an alternative argument that, if

the statute is ambiguous, it is void for vagueness as applied to the defendants.
(Rs., pp.54-55; Tr., p.6, L.20 - p.13, L.17.) Ms. Coleman and Mr. McGhee continue to
assert that the district court correctly found that the statute unambiguously exempts
vehicles travelling on controlled-access highways from having to signal continuously for
5 seconds before changing lanes. However, should this Court find that the statute is
ambiguous, it necessarily must find the statute void for vagueness as applied to the
defendants in this case.
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The Idaho Supreme Court has defined the void-for-vagueness doctrine as
follows:
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is premised upon the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This doctrine
requires that a statute defining criminal conduct be worded with sufficient
clarity and definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct
is prohibited and that the statute be worded in a manner that does not
allow arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Village of Hoffman
Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 102 S.Ct. 1186,
71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982). It is a basic principle of due process that an
enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222
(1972). Furthermore, as a matter of due process, no one may be required
at the peril of loss of liberty to speculate as to the meaning of penal
statutes. United States v. Smith, 795 F.2d 841, 847 n. 4 (9th Cir.1986)
citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453, 59 S.Ct. 618, 619, 83
L.Ed. 888, 890 (1939)), Smith v. United States, cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1032, 107 S.Ct. 1964, 95 L.Ed.2d 535 (1987). This Court has held that
due process requires that all "be informed as to what the State commands
or forbids" and that "men of common intelligence" not be forced to guess
at the meaning of the criminal law. State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 969
P.2d 244 (1998), citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574, 94 S.Ct.
1242, 1248, 39 L.Ed.2d 605, 612 (1974). A statute may be void for
vagueness if it fails to give adequate notice to people of ordinary
intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes, Schwartzmi/ler v.
Gardner, 752 F .2d 1341, 1345 (9th Cir.1984 ), or if it fails to establish
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement or others who must enforce
the statute. Ko/ender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58, 103 S.Ct. 1855,
1858-59, 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 908-09 (1983); State v. Larsen, 135 Idaho 754,
756, 24 P.3d 702, 704 (2001 ).

State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711-712 (2003), abrogated on other grounds by
Evans v. Michigan, 133 S. Ct. 1069, 185 L. Ed. 2d 124 (U.S. 2013). "To succeed on an
'as applied' vagueness challenge, a complainant must show that the statute, as applied
to the defendant's conduct, failed to provide fair notice that the defendant's conduct was
proscribed or failed to provide sufficient guidelines such that the police had unbridled
discretion in determining whether to arrest him." Id.
The State asserts that if I.C. § 49-808(2) is ambiguous, this Court should find that
the legislature intended that drivers signal for 5 seconds while driving on controlled22

access highways before changing
a d

apparently based upon the belief that requiring

to signal for less than 5 seconds in that circumstance would not be

(Appellant's Brief, pp.13-16.)

Ultimately, if this Court finds that I.C. § 49-808(2) is

ambiguous and must engage in a search for the legislature's intent beyond the plain
words in the statute, this Court must necessarily find that the statute failed to provide
fair notice that the defendant's conduct was proscribed.
In State Department of Transportation v. Burton, 149 Idaho 746 (Ct. App. 2010),
a driver was on a "predominantly two-lane highway when her lane of travel expanded to
include a left-hand lane to be used only for passing."

Id. at 747.

The driver never

entered the passing lane, saw a sign stating that the lanes merged, and did not signal
when the lanes merged back into one.

Id.

The driver was pulled over for violating

I.C. § 49-808(1 ), and was ultimately charged with driving under the influence. Id. The
Court of Appeals held that the statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied in those
circumstances because the statute does not clearly require a turn signal where two
lanes merged, "with neither lane clearly ending and neither clearly continuing." Id. at
749.
In the present case, the State's alternative ambiguity argument is based upon the
supposition that, like I.C. § 49-808(1 )'s failure to state whether a person must signal at
all when two lanes merge with neither lane clearly beginning or ending, I.C. § 49-808(2)
neither clearly requires a person to signal their intention to change lanes while travelling
on a controlled-access highway, nor clearly exempts such a person from the 5-second
requirement.

It is undisputed that Ms. Coleman signaled for 3 seconds prior to

changing lanes (and for an additional 3 seconds while completing the lane change). As
such, should this Court conclude that the statute is ambiguous in this aspect, this Court
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must also conclude that the statute failed to provide clear notice that Ms. Coleman was
required to signal for 5 seconds prior to changing lanes, and this Court must conclude
the statute is void for vagueness as applied to her and Mr. McGhee, and must affirm the
district court's dismissal of the charges.

F.
This Court Should Reject The State's Argument That Trooper Gonzales Was
···· ""·'·'·"'~'"'""'·'·'·"'""·Gf)eratfftg4JnderA1t·@Dieetively-·R-easooaefe,,Mffitake·{)f..l:aw · ..,,.,.~,. . ,,,,. =~.··,,=~·"=·=""· ·................ · · · ........................................................
The State attempts to avoid the dismissal of the charges against Ms. Coleman
and Mr. McGhee by asserting that Trooper Gonzales made an objectively reasonable
mistake of law 1°, while recognizing that neither the State of Idaho nor the United States
Supreme Court have ever adopted such a justification. (Appellant's Brief, pp.16-23.) 11
This Court should reject the State's assertion for multiple reasons.
First, even assuming that Trooper Gonzales mistakenly believed that Idaho
Code§ 49-808(2) requires that a person changing lanes on a controlled-access
highway must signal for 5 seconds when not turning from a parked position, for the
reasons stated in section C(2) above, the statute clearly does not require that the all 5
seconds of the signaling occur "before" the lane change.

Second, for the reasons

stated in section D above, I.C. § 49-808(1) requires only that a person travelling on a
highway change lanes after signaling an intention to move right or left, but are not

The district court specifically found that Trooper Gonzales' mistake was unreasonable
~iven the plain language in the statute.
1 The State's argument relies in large part on the North Carolina Supreme Court's
decision in State v. Heien, 737 S.E.2d 351 (N.C. 2012), which, notably, is the approach
taken by the minority of jurisdictions. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.17-23.) The United
States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the Heien case. State v. Heien, 749
S.E.2d 278 (N.C. 2013), cert. granted, Heien v. North Carolina, 134 S. Ct. 1872 (U.S.
Apr. 21, 2014) (No. 13-604). The question presented is: 'Whether a police officer's
mistake of law can provide the individualized suspicion that the Fourth Amendment
requires to justify a traffic stop." See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Heien v. North
Carolina, No. 13-604 (Nov. 13, 2013), 2013 WL 6091788 at *i.
10
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required to signal for 5 seconds, and change lanes in a reasonably

manner. Next,

the only way that Trooper Gonzales could have possibly made an objectively
reasonable mistake is if this Court finds the statute ambiguous. As a matter of common
sense, an objectively reasonable mistake of law cannot occur where the law in question
is unambiguously opposed to the officer's mistaken understanding.

Thus, for the

reasons stated in section E above, if this Court finds the statute ambiguous, it must find
the statute void for vagueness as it applies to Ms. Coleman and Mr. McGhee. Finally,
for the reasons stated below, this Court should reject the State's basic premise that this
Court should condone a violation of Ms. Coleman's and Mr. McGhee's Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures because the officer didn't know
the law.
"The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness." United States v.

Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001 ).

"[l]n order to satisfy the 'reasonableness'

requirement of the Fourth Amendment, what is generally demanded of the many factual
determinations that must regularly be made by agents of the government ... is not that
they always be correct, but that they always be reasonable." See Illinois v. Rodriguez,
497 U.S. 177, 185 (1990) (emphasis added).

Because officers may encounter

ambiguous situations, "room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part. But the
mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their
conclusions of probability."

Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)

(emphasis added).
Although courts allow for reasonable mistakes of fact on the part of the officers,
based upon the presumption that such mistakes, in and of themselves, do not make a
warrantless search or seizure unreasonable, State v. McCarthy, 133 Idaho 119
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(Ct. App. 1999), the same justification is not present when the officer is mistaken about
the law, no matter how reasonable the mistake may be.

Neither Idaho State Police

Troopers, not any other law enforcement officers interpret laws
duly passed by legislatures.

Judicial bodies interpret laws.

they enforce the laws
Idaho's government is

"divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no
person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging
to one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of
the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted." IDAHO CONST.
Art. II,§ 1. If adopted by this Court, the State's proposal would threaten the separation
of powers. Law enforcement officers, as part of the executive branch, would essentially
usurp the lawmaking powers of the legislature under the State's approach, because
validating detentions based on mistakes of law due to any sort of ambiguity in a statute
would "sweep behavior into the statute which the authors of the statute may have had in
mind but failed to put into the plain language of the statute."

See United States v.

Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1278 (11 th Cir. 2003); see also IDAHOCONST. Art Ill,§ 1.
Furthermore, "As a rule, if a defendant is presumed to know the law, we must
expect as much from law enforcement." United States v. Orduna-Martinez, 561 F.3d
1134, 1137 n.2 (10

th

Cir. 2009).

The State's approach would essentially hold law

enforcement officers to a lower standard that it holds citizens.

If a defendant is

presumed to know what conduct is and is not prohibited, surely police officers must me
presumed to know this as well.

The idea that officers who are ignorant of the law

should be allowed to interpret the law illustrates "the fundamental unfairness of holding
citizens to 'the traditional rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse,' Bryan v. United

States, [524 U.S. 184, 196 (1998)), while allowing those 'entrusted to enforce' the law to
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ignorant of it." Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d at 1280. To hold otherwise would be to
officers and citizens with fundamental unfairness. The State's approach allows law
enforcement officers to interpret the laws they are charged with enforcing as they see
fit, and as long as their interpretation is "objectively reasonable," their actions are
beyond reproach. On the other hand, if a citizen has an "objectively reasonable" belief
that prohibited conduct is not prohibited, the citizen is nonetheless subject to criminal
sanctions.

The reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment is a shield

designed to protect citizens from governmental intrusion into their liberty - not a sword
designed to excuse governmental intrusion into citizens' liberty.
Furthermore, the State's approach is nothing more than a surreptitious attack on
Idaho's exclusionary rule. 12 Although the State asserts that the intrusion involved in
seizing a motorist is a "minimal intrusion on the privacy of the individual stopped" and
therefore is distinct from Idaho Court decisions rejecting the "good faith" exception to
the exclusionary rule (Appellant's Brief, p.19), Idaho's exclusionary rule is not
dependent upon the extent of the intrusion involved.

In State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho

981 (1991 ), the Idaho Supreme Court rejected the so-called good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897 (1984 ). The State recently asked the Idaho Supreme Court to overrule its
Guzman decision and adopt the Leon good-faith exception. See State v. Koivu, 152

12

Neither party argued the application of Article I, § 17 and whether it grants greater
protections than the Fourth Amendment in the district court. However, if this Court is
willing to hear the Plaintiff-Appellant's argument that the constitutional violation in this
case can be cured because Trooper Gonzales made a "reasonable mistake of law,"
because the seizure was only "minimally intrusive" and thus the exclusionary rule
applies, this Court should be willing to consider that the argument itself is a clandestine
request that this Court overturn Idaho precedent - a request that was not made by the
Plaintiff-Appellant in the district court.
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Idaho 511 (2012). The Koivo Court recognized that Idaho courts have long adopted the
that "the evidence unlawfully obtained should be excluded simply because it
was obtained in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights." Koivu, 152 Idaho at
516 (citing State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43, 57-58 (1927)). Justice Bistline, the author of
Guzman, 13 stated:

[T]he exclusionary rule should be applied in order to: 1) provide an
effective remedy to persons who have been subjected to an unreasonable
government search and/or seizure; 2) deter the police from acting
unlawfully in obtaining evidence; 3) encourage thoroughness in the
warrant issuing process; 4) avoid having the judiciary commit an additional
constitutional violation by considering evidence which has been obtained
through illegal means; and 5) preserve judicial integrity.
Guzman, 122 Idaho at 993. Nothing in Idaho precedent suggests that the exclusionary

rule should not apply so long as the officer, in good-faith, only violated the defendant's
right to be free from searches and seizures "just a little bit."
Finally, at its heart, the State's mistake-of-law argument requires this Court to
find that Ms. Coleman did not violate any traffic laws, find that Ms. Coleman and
Mr. McGhee were seized without a warrant and without objectively reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity, find that if such actions were to occur in the future, it would
clearly and undeniably be a violation of the Fourth Amendment rights of the person(s)
seized, but still allow the evidence gathered in this case to be used against
Ms. Coleman and Mr. McGhee. The State asks this Court to so hold because Trooper
Gonzales didn't know the law, but in good faith, thought she did. The State's position is
antithesis to the very notion that the United States Constitution and the Idaho
Constitution protect all people in similar circumstances, from similar governmental

13

The Court in Koivu noted that a majority of the Guzman Court rejected the good-faith
exception, but a majority did not agree upon the reasons. Koivu, 152 Idaho at 518.
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intrusions. Instead the State essentially asks this Court to create an exception to the
rth Amendment that only applies to Ms. Coleman and Mr. McGhee, and find that,
although their warrantless seizure was not based upon reasonable suspicion, it was
justified because Trooper Gonzales subjectively and erroneously thought it was. This
Court should reject the State's request.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Coleman and Mr. McGhee respectfully request that this Court affirm the
district court's dismissal of the charges against them.
DATED this 29 th day of July, 2014.

Df;i~uty State Appellate Public Defender
I
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